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cases, quite pleasantly careless about their own affairs, jacks of
many trades and usually masters of none-not even their own.
A curious compound which I can not approve nor urge upon
others; yet for myself I have enjoyed it all, remembering video
ineliora, and acknowledging deteriora sequor.
August, 1924.
ADDENDUM
The foregoing article manifests a boldness and an inde-
pendence of thought which challenges many of the principles
on which the members of the legal profession have been wont
to base their professional attitudes. It is believed that much the
same boldness and independence pervade Judge Hough's
judicial opinions. Obviously, it is possible to present here only
a few examples, and they selected after a very inadequate
sampling of his opinions. During his ten years as district judge
he wrote 1,8o9 opinions and in his eleven years service as a
member of the Circuit Court of Appeals he participated in 2,047
cases, writing the opinion of the court in 675. Something in the
quality and character of these judicial utterances gave to this
judge the enviable reputation of being one of the half dozen
really great judges of the Federal Bench.
Immediately following the World War housing shortage
was very acute in many urban centers. To remedy this situation
the New York Housing Laws of i92o were passed. By them
the existing rental of resident property in Metropolitan New
York was stabilized at the rental of the previous September for
a period of two years. The constitutionality of these laws came
before Judge Hough's court and the following is from his
opinion in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 F.
3o6 (i92o).
"But, no matter how astonishing the legislation appears to
the citizen, it has been so many times said that the wisdom,
expediency or sincerity of the Legislature is not open to judicial
inquiry, that citation is superfluous. Judicial review is, and
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always has been, properly limited to an inquiry into the reason
for the ascertained legislative intention-starting with the
premise that the mere "say so" of the Legislature does not fur-
nish a reason by its mere existence ...
"The reason for the laws here involved is patent from the
public documents above mentioned; no appeal need be made to
common knowledge or contemporary observation. In October
last, the Municipal Courts of New York City were flooded with
more 'notices to quit'--i.e., summary dispossess proceedings-
than had ever before been known during an entire year. They
amounted to iooooo, and according to the estimate of families
commonly used by local relief associations and other statis-
ticians the number of persons involved in each dispossess pro-
ceedings was not less than 4, and in all probability 5. This
meant that nearly io per cent of the permanent population of
the city would (if existing laws took their course) shortly be
seeking other habitations on the eve of winter. ...
"On reason, then, if a given subject-matter is appropriate
to the exercise of sovereign action, and such action has not been
expressly and absolutely prohibited by the federal Constitution
as authoritatively construed, the legislative result is not for-
bidden, where the purpose is within the range of reserved
sovereignty, the means appropriate, and the reason sufficient,
even though in reaching the result some toes be trodden on;
and how many toes and how severely they may be trampled is
a question that varies with circumstances. We may inquire,
therefore, whether the subject-matter of these statutes is his-
torically appropriate for legislative regulation. While rarely,
if ever, exercised in America, there can be no doubt that one
of the oldest exercises of sovereignty has been to fix the price
and use of some of the necessities of life, especially bread.
Shelter is as much a necessary as bread, and that likewise has in
times of stress been the subject of regulation, and indeed of
apportionment. . ..
"There have been, however, since the dawn of our legal
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history, some occupations closely allied with the necessities of
life, which have always been governmentally regulated, both
as to prices chargeable and persons to be served. The usual
examples are innkeepers, carriers, millers, ferrymen, and
wharfingers. At common law the property of these men was
held to be devoted to a public use, and their occupations were
public business. . . . it may be and has been asserted
that any business is affected with a public interest as soon as the
electorate become sufficiently interested in it to pass a regula-
tory statute. It is not necessary to go so far, but we must and
do hold that the business of renting out living space, is quite
as suitable for statutory regulation, and as much affected with
a public interest, as fire insurance and trading stamps. It is easy
to multiply quotations as to the inviolability of private business.
It is singular how uniformly they come from decisions holding
some business open to intimate regulation, while saying that, if
such business were only private, it could not be regulatedi but
never is 'private business' defined. It is another of those phrases
which is left to a process of 'inclusion and exclusion,' which
really means a finding of facts."
The following extracts from Associated Press v. Interna-
tional News Service, 245 Fed. Rep. 244, manifest a purpose to
confine remedial justice within its conceptual confines, but, as
was the characteristic of Lord Eldon, boldly to expand them in
the interest of justice. Judge Hough in this opinion struggled
manfully to pin a 'property' label in order to bring the difficult
fact situation within the benevolent protection of equity rather
than to suggest an abandonment of the property requirement
for equity's jurisdiction. His problem was to find a satisfactory
justification for the granting of an injunction to enjoin a rival
news gathering association from utilizing the plaintiff's bulletins
after publication. Apparently unwilling, however, to rest his
decision on the "property in news" basis, Judge Hough ruled
that the defendant's conduct amounted to unfair competition.
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"As a matter of fact, one who, on hearing a rumor or asser-
tion, investigates and verifies it, whether with much or little
effort, acquires knowledge by processes of his own; the result
is his ...
"With the existence of a truth, with physical facts per se,
neither plaintiff nor defendant is concerned; for them, facts in
that absolute sense are but an ore in a mountain or fish in the
sea-valueless unless and until by labor mined or caught for
use. Nor are facts, even after ascertainment, news, unless they
have that indefinable quality of interest, which attracts public
attention. Neither is news always synonymous with facts, in the
sense of verity; indeed, much news ultimately proves fictitious,
yet it is excellent' news notwithstanding ...
"Whether there is or can be any property in facts per se,
any more than there is in ideas or mental concepts, is a meta-
physical query that can be laid aside; for there is no doubt,
either on reason or authority, that there is a property right in
news capable of and entitled to legal protection. Property
covers everything that has an exchangeable value . . . that
news possesses the quality stated, seems obvious enough, when
it is observed that defendant takes it, in order to exchange it
against dollars ....
"It is sought, if not to limit the doctrine of property in
news to the time during which it remains locked up in the breast
of its gatherer, to interpret the decisions cited as meaning only
that news is 'like a trade secret' (198 U.S. 250, 25 Sup. Ct. 637,
49 L. Ed. 1031), lost when divulged in the course of busi-
ness. . . . But news is far more than a trade secret, for that
must remain private to have its best value, while news is
obtained for publicity alone. . . . It is reasonable and just that
each member of plaintiff and plaintiff itself should have a
property right in its news until the reasonable reward of each
member is received, and that means (with due allowance for
the earth's rotation) until plaintiff's most Western member has
enjoyed his reward, which is, not to have his local competitor
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supplied in time for competition with what he has paid for.
Surely this is a modest limit of rights ...
"Equity, however, is not stayed because a name does not
fit, or one is not at hand to accurately describe a wrong of a kind
necessarily infrequent.* If defendant takes what some one else
owns, and sells it as of right, in rivalry with the owner, such
competition is more than unfair; it is patently unlawful and the
wider term comprises the narrower. But, laying aside the right
of property* as the ultimate foundation of suit, the business
method of selling, in competition with plaintiff and its members,
something falsely represented as gathered by defendant other-
wise than from bulletins and earlier editions is unfair because
it is parasitic and untrue. It is immoral, and that is usually
unfair to some one ...
"To commercially distribute news not gathered by the
sender is under the facts shown here an invasion of property
rights; to send it out as one's own labor is marked by that dolus
which is fraud, and that is the basis of the doctrine of unfair
competition in its wide sense."
The process by which equity expands into new fields or
undertakes harder tasks in old ones, perhaps formerly refused,
is strikingly revealed in Kearns-Gorsuch Co. v. Hartford-Fair-
mont Co., I F (2d) 318.
" . . . defendant urges . . . that specific performance
cannot be ordered, because by so doing the court would require
from both parties, and would be required to supervise, 'the
exercise of skill, personal labor, and experienced judgment in
the continuous operation of a manufacturing business.'
"The contention rests on decisions, of which Rutland Co. v.
Ripley, io Wall. 339, and Javierre v. Central Altagracia, 217
U.s. 502, are controlling here. The law does move with the
times, and usually moves first in the lower courts; indeed, the
historic function of Supreme Courts is to prevent too rapid
* Italics added.
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advance. For me the statement (or perhaps dictum) of Life
Preserver, etc., Co. v. National, etc., Co., 252 Fed. 139, still
represents the present state of the law, viz. protracted super-
visions of a business should not be assumed, but it is not true
that it cannot be assumed. Everything depends on how insist-
ently the justice of the case demands the court's assumptions
of difficult, unfamiliar, and contentious business problems. The
tendency of the times is to 'take on' harder and longer pobs....
As a judge of first instance I would not nowadays hesitate to
undertake any business enterprise for which, with the support
of competent receivers, I thought a reasonably intelligent judge
reasonably fit."
In the case of United States Asphalt Refining Co. v. Trini-
dad Lake Petroleum Co. (1914) 22 Fed. ioo6, Judge Hough
felt compelled to hold that the failure to comply with an arbi-
tration clause in an English charter party was not a defense to
an action for its breach in the Federal Courts. He concluded
that "the decisions cited show beyond question that the Supreme
Court has laid down the rule that such complete ouster of
jurisdiction . . . is void in the Federal Forum." A large part
of his opinion, however, is a vigorous protest against the doc-
trine and a fearless elaboration of its basic weakness even though
it has the support of great names. The sweeping statutory
changes in arbitration statutes which began about I92O in this
country by which the arbitration clause in commercial contracts
was made enforceable and effective may have been stimulated
in no small measure by this searching opinion.
"There has long been a great variety of available reasons
for refusing to give effect to the agreements of men of mature
age, and presumably sound judgment, when the intended effect
of the agreements was to prevent proceedings in any and all
courts and substitute therefor the decision of arbitrators. The
remarkably simple nature of this libelant's contract breaking has
led me to consider at some length the nature and history of the
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reasons adduced to justify the sort of conduct, by no means new,
but remarkably well illustrated by these libels.
"It has never been denied that the hostility of English-
speaking courts to arbitration contracts probably originated (as
Lord Campbell said in Scott v. Avery, 4 H.L. Cas. 811i)-
'in the contests of the courts of ancient times for extension of jurisdiction
-all of them being opposed to anything that would altogether deprive
every one of them of jurisdiction.'
"A more unworthy genesis cannot be imagined. Since (at
the latest) the time of Lord Kenyon, it has been customary to
stand rather upon the antiquity of the rule than upon its excel-
lence or reason:
'It is not necessary now to say how this point ought to have been
determined if it were res integra-it having been decided again and
again,' etc. Per Kenyon, J., in Thompson v. Charnock, 8 T.R. 139.
"There is little difference between Lord Kenyon's remark
and the words of Cardozo, J., uttered within a few months in
Meachar v. Jamestown, etc., R. R. Co., 2 11 N.Y. at page 354:
'It is true that some judges have expressed the belief that parties
ought to be free to contract about such matters as they please. In this
state the law has long been settled to the contrary.'
"Nevertheless the legal mind must assign some reason in
order to decide anything with spiritual quiet, and the causes
advanced for refusing to compel men to abide by their arbitra-
tion contracts may apparently be subdivided as follows:
"(a) The contract is in its nature revocable.
"(b) Such contracts are against public policy.
"(c) The covenant to refer is but collateral to the main
contract, and may be disregarded, leaving the contract keeper
to his action for damages for breach of such collateral covenant.
"(d) Any contract tending to wholly oust the courts of
jurisdiction violates the spirit of the laws creating the courts,
in that it is not competent for private persons either to increase
or diminish the statutory juridical power.
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"(e) Arbitration may be a condition precedent to suit, and
as such valid, if it does not prevent legal action, or seek to
determine out of court the general question of liability.
"THE DOCTRINE OF REVOCABILITY
"This seems to rest on Vynior's Case, 8 Coke, 8 ib, and is
now somewhat old-fashioned, although it appears in Oregon,
etc., Bank v. American, etc., Co., 35 Fed. 23, with due citations
of authority; and in Tobey v. County of Bristol, 3 Story, 800,
it is treated at great length.
"'THE PUBLIC POLICY DOCTRINE
"No reason for the simple statement that arbitration agree-
ments are against public policy has ever been advanced, except
that it must be against such policy to oust the courts of juris-
diction. This is hardly a variant of the reasoning ascribed by
Lord Campbell to the 'courts of ancient times':
" 'Such stipulations [for arbitration] are regarded as against the
policy of the common law, as having a tendency to exclude the jurisdic-
tion of the courts.' Hurst v. Litchfield, 39 N.Y. 377.
" 'Such agreements have repeatedly been held to be against public
policy and void.' Prince Co. v. Lehman, 39 Fed. 704.
"The above are two examples of the cruder forms of state-
ment; but of late years the higher courts have been somewhat
chary of the phrase 'public policy,' and in Insurance Co. v.
Morse, 20 Wall. 457, Hunt, J., quotes approvingly from
Story's Commentaries, thus:
" 'Where the stipulation, though not against the policy of the law,
yet is an effort to divest the ordinary jurisdiction of the common tribunals
of justice, such as an agreement in case of dispute to refer the same to
arbitration, a court of equity will not, any more than a court of law,
interfere to enforce the agreement, but will leave the parties to their own
good pleasure in regard to such agreements.'
"But neither the court nor the commentator pointed out any
other method by which an arbitration agreement could be
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against the policy of the law, unless it were by seeking to divest
the 'ordinary jurisdiction of the common tribunals of justice.'
"Having built up the doctrine that any contract which
involves an 'ouster of jurisdiction' is invalid, the Supreme Court
of the United States has been able of late years to give decision
without ever going behind that statement ...
"THE DOCTRINE THAT THE COVENANT TO REFER IS
COLLATERAL ONLY
"This idea is set forth with his customary clearness by
Jessel, M. R., in Dawson v. Fitzgerald, I Ex. D. 257. It was
repeated in Perkins v. United States, etc., Co., supra and
accepted in Crossley v. Connecticut, etc., Co., 27 Fed. 3o. The
worthlessness of the theory was amply demonstrated in Mun-
Fed. 926, where Judge Brown, accepting without query or
son v. Straits of Dover [S.S. Co.], 99 Fed. 787, affirmed 102
comment the doctrine that any agreement which completely
ousted the courts of jurisdiction was specifically unenforceable,
found himself unable to award more than nominal damages for
the breach of the collateral agreement. The opinion for affirm-
ance (102 Fed. 926), is written by Wallace, J., who had himself
pointed out in Perkins v. United States, etc., Co., supra, that the
action for breach of the collateral agreement to refer was a
remedy against the contract breaker who sued when he had
promised not to. Comment seems superfluous upon any theory
of law (if law be justice) that can come to such conclusions.
"THE THEORY THAT ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS VIOLATE
THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWs CREATING THE COURTS
"This is the accepted doctrine in New York, as shown in
Meacham v. Jamestown, etc., Railroad, supra. Yet it is surely
a singular view of juridical sanctity which reasons that, because
the Legislature has made a court, therefore everybody must go
to the court.
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"THE THEORY THAT A LIMITED ARBITRATION, NOT OUSTING
THE COURTS OF JURISDICTION, MAY BE VALID
"This is thought to be the doctrine of Delaware, etc., Co. v.
Pennsylvania, etc., Co., 50 N.Y. 265, and it is plainly accepted
by the Supreme Court of the United States. Hamilton v. Liver-
pool, etc., Insurance Co., 136 U.S. at page 255, shows the
familiar proviso in an insurance policy by which the amount of
loss or damage to the property insured shall be ascertained by
arbitrators or appraisers, and further that, until such an award
should be obtained, the loss should not be payable and no action
should lie against the insurer. This makes the appraisal or
partial arbitration a condition precedent to suit ...
"But persons who would thus far avail themselves of com-
pulsory arbitration must be careful, for it has been said:
" 'While parties may impose, as a condition precedent to applications
to the courts, that they shall first have settled the amount to be recovered
by an agreed mode, they cannot entirely close the access to the courts
of law. . . Such stipulations are repugnant to the rest of the contract
and assume to divest courts of their established jurisdiction. As condi-
tions precedent to an appeal to the courts, they are void.' Stephenson v.
Insurance Co., 54 Me. 70, cited in Insurance Co. v. Morse, supra ...
"Whatever form of statement the rule takes, the foregoing
citations show that it always amounts to the same thing, viz.:
The courts will scarcely permit any other body of men to even
partially perform judicial work and will never permit the
absorption of all the business growing out of disputes over a
contract by any body of arbitrators, unless compelled to such
action by statute. Even such cases as Mittenthal v. Mascagni,
183 Mass. 19, show no more than a belated acceptance of the
right to confine litigation by contract to a particular court, for
even that opinion does not recognize the right of mankind to
contract themselves out of all courts.
"The English -Arbitration Act, . . . is such a statute. It
has compelled the courts of that country to abandon the doctrine
that it is wrong or wicked to agree to stay away from the courts
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when disputes arise. It is highly characteristic of lawyers that,
when thus coerced by the Legislature, the wisdom of previous
decisions begins to be doubted. In Hamlyn v. Talisker Dis-
tillery, (1894) App. Cas. 202, Lord Watson said:
'The rule that a reference to arbitrators not named cannot be
enforced does not appear to me to rest on any essential considerations of
public policy. Even if an opposite inference were deducible from the
authorities by which it was established, the rule has been so largely
trenched upon by the legislation of the last 50 years . . . that I should
hesitate to affirm that the policy upon which it was originally based could
now be regarded as of cardinal importance.'
"Neither the Legislature of New York nor the Congress
has seen fit thus to modernize the ideas of the judges of their
respective jurisdictions. .... "
Judge Hough appreciated the dangers of arbitrary power
and the necessity for an established procedure to control admin-
istrative action. He appreciated a difference in these tribunals
in this respect. The following from his pen was recently quoted
by Professor Frankfurter.*
"'When I have before me a case on review from the Inter-
state Commerce Commission, almost instinctively I want to
sustain their order. When I have before me a case to review of
the Federal Trade Commission, almost instinctively I want to
reverse it.' " H.W.V.
* 12 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 27'. (This statement was made in the early
days of the Federal Trade Commission.)
